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ABSTRACT
High-performance spoofing countermeasure systems for au-
tomatic speaker verification (ASV) have been proposed in
the ASVspoof 2019 challenge. However, the robustness of
such systems under adversarial attacks has not been studied
yet. In this paper, we investigate the vulnerability of spoofing
countermeasures for ASV under both white-box and black-
box adversarial attacks with the fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) and the projected gradient descent (PGD) method.
We implement high-performing countermeasure models in
the ASVspoof 2019 challenge and conduct adversarial at-
tacks on them. We compare performance of black-box at-
tacks across spoofing countermeasure models with different
network architectures and different amount of model param-
eters. The experimental results show that all implemented
countermeasure models are vulnerable to FGSM and PGD
attacks under the scenario of white-box attack. The more
dangerous black-box attacks also prove to be effective by the
experimental results.
Index Terms— Adversarial attack, anti-spoofing, spoof-
ing countermeasure, white-box attack, black-box attack
1. INTRODUCTION
Automatic speaker verification (ASV) aim to confirm that a
given utterance is pronounced by a specified speaker. It is
now a mature technology for biometric authentication [1–8].
Modern speaker verification systems harness the combina-
tion of several modules to tackle the problem of ASV. In [5],
for example, Gaussian mixture models (GMMs) are trained
to model the acoustic features and likelihood ratio is used
for scoring. Recently, ASV systems based on deep learn-
ing models require fewer concepts and heuristics compared
to traditional speaker verification systems and have achieved
considerable performance improvement. Heigold et al. [6]
proposed an integrated model with end-to-end style which di-
rectly learns a mapping from a test utterance and a few ref-
erence utterances to a verification score, resulting in compact
structure and sufficiently good performance. However, past
research has shown that ASV systems are vulnerable to ma-
licious attacks using spoofing and fake audios, such as syn-
thetic, converted and replayed speech.
Anti-spoofing countermeasures for speaker verification
systems arouse keen interests and several novel studies have
been done [9–19]. The ASVspoof 2019 challenge [20], a
community-led challenge, attracts more than 60 international
industrial and academic teams to investigate spoofing coun-
termeasures for ASV. Both the scenarios of logical access
(LA) and physical access (PA) are taken into account. The
LA scenario involves fake audios synthesized by modern
text-to-speech synthesis (TTS) and voice conversion (VC)
models. The PA scenario involves replayed audio recorded in
reverberant environment under different acoustic and replay
configurations. Several teams achieve excellent performance
in detecting spoofing and reinforcing robustness of ASV sys-
tems under both LA and PA scenarios [20]. Yet according
to [21, 22], machine learning models with impressive perfor-
mance can be vulnerable to adversarial attacks [23]. Are the
spoofing countermeasures for ASV in [20] robust enough to
defend against adversarial examples?
An adversarial example x˜ is generated by the combination
of a tiny perturbation and a normal instance x. It is very simi-
lar to the original normal instance x and may even be visually
or acoustically indistinguishable to human, but will lead the
neural networks to incorrectly classify it as any target t given
a specific perturbation. Szegedy et al. [21] claim that well-
trained neural network for image classification can succumb
to adversarial attacks. The vulnerability of automatic speech
recognition (ASR) neural network model under adversarial
attacks is proved in [22], where an adversarial example can
be transcribed as any phrase. However, to our best knowl-
edge, the robustness of spoofing countermeasure systems for
ASV under the adversarial attacks has not been studied yet.
In this paper, we implement several high-performance spoof-
ing countermeasure models in the ASVspoof 2019 challenge
and assess the reliability of these models under the attack of
adversarial examples.
Adversarial attacks contains two main scenarios: white-
box attack and black-box attack. White-box attacks are those
where the adversary requires knowledge of the target model
internals and adversarial examples are generated by an opti-
mization strategy applied to the input space while fixing the
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model’s parameters. Black-box attacks, such as [24], have no
access to target model internals, only to its inputs and out-
puts. With the paired data acquired from available training
data or by testing the online target model, a substitute for the
target model can be trained. Then adversarial examples are
easily crafted by the substitute and then used to attack the tar-
get model. The successful attack in the black-box scenarios,
to some extent, guarantees the success of white-box attack be-
cause black-box attack requires less information and is more
difficult than white-box attack. In this paper, for the sake of
completeness, both white-box attacks and black box attacks
are adopted to assess the reliability of spoofing countermea-
sure systems for ASV. There are a lot of adversarial attack
approaches [23, 25–28]. In this paper, we adopt the fast gra-
dient sign method (FGSM) [23] and the projected gradient
descent (PGD) method [27].
This paper is the first one investigating the vulnerability
of spoofing countermeasures for ASV under both white-box
and black-box adversarial attacks. We compare performance
of black-box attacks across spoofing countermeasure mod-
els with different network architectures and different number
of parameters. We implement countermeasure models which
achieve comparable or even better anti-spoofing performance
than some high-performance models in the ASVspoof 2019
challenge and we successfully attack them under both white-
box and black-box attack scenarios. All our codes will be
made open-source 1.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
the detailed description of two ASV spoofing countermeasure
models. In section 3, we introduce the procedure of adversar-
ial audio generation with two adversarial attack methods, i.e.,
the FGSM and the PGD method. In section 4, we report the
experimental setups. The experiment results and discussion
are given in section 5. Finally, we conclude this paper in sec-
tion 6.
2. ASV SPOOFING COUNTERMEASURE MODELS
Up to the submission time of this paper, only a few top-
ranking systems in the ASVspoof 2019 challenge have acces-
sible and complete model description. We choose two kinds
of models, proposed by team T44 and team T45, to conduct
adversarial attack experiments. According to the results of the
ASVspoof 2019 challenge, the overall best performing single
system for the LA scenario is proposed by team T45. The
authors adopt an angular margin based softmax (A-softmax)
[29] loss rather than traditional softmax with cross-entropy
loss to train a Light CNN (LCNN) architecture [30]. The
system proposed by team T44 is ranked 3-rd and 14-th places
for the PA and LA scenarios, respectively. Team T44 adopts a
Squeeze-Excitation extended ResNet (SENet) as one of mod-
els in their submitted system. We provide brief description of
1Codes are available at https://github.com/ano-demo/
AdvAttacksASVspoof
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Fig. 1. The Max-Feature-Map (MFM) activation function for
convolution layer.
these two kinds of models in the next two subsections.
2.1. LCNN model and A-Softmax
The LCNN architecture is successfully adopted for replay at-
tacks detection in [16] and outperformed other proposed sys-
tems in ASVspoof 2017 challenge [31]. The LCNN architec-
ture adopt the Max-Feature-Map (MFM) activation based on
the Max-Out activation function. The MFM activation func-
tion for a convolutional layer is illustrated in Fig. 1, which is
defined as
yki,j = max(x
k
i,j , x
k+N2
i,j ),
∀i = 1, H, j = 1,W , k = 1, N/2, (1)
where x is the input feature map of size H ×W ×N , y is the
output feature map of size H ×W × N2 .
To enhance the anti-spoofing performance of LCNN ar-
chitecture, team T44 utilizes an A-Softmax loss to train the
model. A-Softmax enables the model to learn angularly dis-
criminative features. Geometrically, A-Softmax loss can be
viewed as imposing discriminative constraints on a hyper-
sphere manifold. A-Softmax is represented as:
Lang =
1
N
∑
i
− log( e
||xi|| cos(mθyi,i)
e||xi|| cos(mθyi,i) +
∑
j 6=yi e
||xi|| cos(θyj,i)
),
(2)
whereN is the number of training samples, {xi}Ni=1 and their
labels {yi}Ni=1 are training pairs, θyi,i is the angle between xi
and the corresponding column yi of weights W in the fully
connected classification layer, and m is an integer that con-
trols the size of an angular margin between classes.
Conv @3x3, stride=
Batch Norm + ReLU
Conv @3x3, stride=1
Conv @1x1, stride=
Batch Norm
Batch Norm
Global Pooling
FC + ReLU
FC + Sigmoid
+
Fig. 2. The Squeeze-Excitation network (SENet) module,
where s is a customized variable specifying the stride and r is
the reduction factor.
2.2. Squeeze-Excitation ResNet model
Squeeze-Excitation network (SENet) adaptively recalibrates
channel-wise feature responses by explicitly modelling de-
pendencies between channels, which has shown great mer-
its in image classification task [32]. In this paper, we imple-
mented a model with network architecture similar to that of
SENet34 in [33]. The overall architecture of an SENet mod-
uel is illustrated in Fig. 2.
3. ADVERSARIAL AUDIO GENERATION
To execute an adversarial attack, we consider the model pa-
rameters θ as fixed and optimize over the input space. Specif-
ically, in this paper, an adversarial example is a perturbed ver-
sion of the input spectral feature x.
x˜ = x+ δ, (3)
where δ is small enough such that the reconstructed speech
signal of the perturbed version x˜ is perceptually indistinguish-
able from the original signal x by humans, but causes the net-
work to make incorrect decision. Searching for a suitable δ
can be formulated as solving the following optimization prob-
lem:
max
δ∈∆
Loss(θ, x+ δ, yx), (4)
where Loss(·) is the loss function, yx is the label of x and ∆ is
a set of allowed perturbation that formalizes the manipulative
power of the adversary. In this paper, ∆ is a small l∞-norm
ball, that is, ∆ = {δ| ||δ||∞ ≤ },  ≥ 0 ∈ R.
To solve the optimization problem (4), in this paper, we
adopt the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [23] and the pro-
jected gradient descent (PGD) method [27].
3.1. Fast gradient sign method
The first adversarial attack method, shorted as the FGSM
method, consists of taking a single step along the direction of
the gradient, i.e.,
δ =  · sign(∇xLoss(θ, x, yx)), (5)
where the sign(·) function simply takes the sign of the gra-
dient ∇xLoss(θ, x, yx). Therefore, given an utterance x, the
adversarial spectral feature can be simply computed as x˜ =
x +  · sign(∇xLoss(θ, x, yx)). While the FGSM benefits
from being the simplest adversarial attack method, it is often
relatively inefficient at solving the maximization problem (4).
3.2. Projected gradient descent method
Unlike the FGSM, which is a single-step method, the PGD
method is an iterative method. Starting from the original input
x0 = x, the input is iteratively updated as follows:
xk+1 = clip(xk + α · sign(∇xkLoss(θ, xk, yxk))),
for k = 0, ...,K − 1, (6)
where α is the step size, K is the number of iterations and
the clip(·) function applies element-wise clipping such that
||xk − x||∞ ≤ ,  ≥ 0 ∈ R. We take xK as the final per-
turbed spectral feature. Intuitively, the PGD method can be
thought of as iteratively applying small-step FGSM, but forc-
ing the perturbed input stay within the admissible set ∆ at
every step. The PGD method allows for more effective at-
tacks but is naturally more computationally expensive than
the FGSM.
The performance of PGD is still limited by the possibility
of sticking at local optima of the loss function. To mitigate
this problem, random restarts is incorporated into the PGD
method [27]. The PGD method with random restarts will be
executed multiple runs. The initial location of the adversarial
example is randomly selected within the admissible perturba-
tion set ∆ and the PGD method will be executed a certain
number of times in one run. The final adversarial example is
the one resulting in maximum loss.
4. EXPERIMENTAL SETUPS
This paper uses the ASVspoof 2019 dataset, which encom-
passes partitions for the assessment of LA and PA scenarios.
In this paper, we only utilize the LA partition, which are them-
selves partitioned into training, development and evaluation
sets. We use raw log power magnitude spectrum computed
from the signal as acoustic features. Following [34], FFT
spectrum is extracted with the Blackman window having size
of 1724 and step-size of 0.0081s. Only the first 600 frames
for each utterance are used as input for all trained models. No
additional preprocessing techniques such as voice activity de-
tection (VAD), pre-emphasis or dereverberation are adopted.
The adversarial attacks are conducted as the following:
We train a spoofing countermeasure model using the training
set. Hyper-parameters of the countermeasure model are tuned
using the development set. We evaluate the anti-spoofing per-
formance and generate adversarial examples using the evalu-
ation set. When generating adversarial examples, we add ad-
versarial perturbation into the acoustic feature vectors using
the FGSM or the PGD method introduced in Section 3. The
perturbed acoustic features are reconstructed into waveform
to attack the well trained countermeasure model.
4.1. Details of countermeasure model implementation
Three countermeasure models are trained, which we term as
LCNN-big, LCNN-small and SENet12. LCNN-big has the
same network architecture as in [34]. LCNN-small has sim-
ilar network architecture to LCNN-big, but with less param-
eters. SENet12 has similar network architecture as in [33]
but with less parameters. The number of parameters of these
three models are shown as in Table 1. LCNN-big model has
larger model capacity than LCNN-small and SENet12 model
in terms of number of model parameters, while LCNN-small
model and SENet12 model have equal model capacity. The
detailed network architecture of LCNN-small and SENet12
model are shown in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively.
LCNN-big and LCNN-small model are trained using the
A-Softmax loss function, while SENet12 is trained using the
original softmax and cross-entropy loss. The constant m in
Eq.(2) is set to 4. To mitigate the overfitting issue, a dropout
rate of 0.75 is used when training LCNN models. We found
that adding a relatively large L2 regularization is helpful to
mitigate the overfitting issue. We set the weight decay rate
at 0.001 when training all these three models. We use Adam
optimizer with a constant learning rate of 0.001 to update the
model parameters in all training cases, where β1 = 0.9 and
β2 = 0.999.
During training stage, we applied early stopping accord-
ing to the classification accuracy on the development set. Dur-
ing inference stage, we took the cosine similarity between the
input and the weight vector in the last FC layer corresponding
to the bonafide class as the score of the utterance.
4.2. Adversarial attacks
We apply both white-box and balck-box adversarial attacks
on the trained countermeasure models with the FGSM and
the PGD method. We investigate adversarial attacks under
Table 1. Number of parameters of LCNN-Big, LCNN-Small
and SENet12 model.
Model LCNN-big LCNN-small SENet12
Num. of parametes 10M 0.51M 0.48M
Table 2. LCNN-small network architecture.
Type Filter / Stride Output
Conv 1 5× 5 / 1× 1 863× 600× 16
MFM 2 − 863× 600× 8
MaxPool 3 2× 2/2× 2 431× 300× 8
Conv 4 1× 1/1× 1 431× 300× 16
MFM 5 − 431× 300× 8
BatchNorm 6 − 431× 300× 8
Conv 7 3× 3/1× 1 431× 300× 24
MFM 8 − 431× 300× 12
MaxPool 9 2× 2/2× 2 215× 150× 12
BatchNorm 10 − 215× 150× 12
Conv 11 1× 1/1× 1 215× 150× 24
MFM 12 − 215× 150× 12
BatchNorm 13 − 215× 150× 12
Conv 14 3× 3/1× 1 215× 150× 24
MFM 15 − 215× 150× 12
MaxPool 16 2× 2/2× 2 107× 75× 12
Conv 17 1× 1/1× 1 107× 75× 24
MFM 18 − 107× 75× 12
BatchNorm 19 − 107× 75× 12
Conv 20 3× 3/1× 1 107× 75× 8
MFM 21 − 107× 75× 4
BatchNorm 22 − 107× 75× 4
Conv 23 1× 1/1× 1 107× 75× 8
MFM 24 − 107× 75× 4
BatchNorm 25 − 107× 75× 4
Conv 26 3× 3/1× 1 107× 75× 8
MFM 27 − 107× 75× 4
MaxPool 28 2× 2/2× 2 53× 37× 4
FC 29 − 64
MFM 30 − 32
BatchNorm 31 − 32
FC 32 − 2
various levels of manipulative power of the adversary on the
audios. In both the FGSM and PGD attack settings,  in Eq.(5)
and Eq.(6) is chosen from the set of {0.1, 1, 5}. To make the
level of manipulative power of the PGD attack consistent with
the FGSM attack, we make the step-size α and  in the PGD
attack scenario satisfy the relationship of
 = number of iterations× α. (7)
Table 3. SENet12 network architecture.
Type Filter / Stride Output
Conv 7× 7 / 2× 2 431× 300× 16
BatchNorm − 431× 300× 16
ReLU − 431× 300× 16
MaxPool 3× 3/2× 2 215× 150× 16
SEResNet Module×1 − 215× 150× 16
SEResNet Module×2 − 107× 75× 32
SEResNet Module×3 − 53× 37× 64
SEResNet Module×1 − 26× 18× 128
Global AvgPool − 128
FC − 2
For example, if  = 1 and number of iterations is 10, then
α is set to be 0.1. The number of random restarts is 5 in all
experiments.
4.3. XAB listening test
To achieve a valid adversarial attack, it is important to make
the adversarial audio examples sound indistinguishable from
the original audio signals by human ears. We conduct an
XAB listensing test, which is a standard way to assess the de-
tectable differences between two choices of sensory stimuli.
The adversarial audio signals are generated from the LCNN-
big using the PGD method with  = 5. Each of the adver-
sarial audio signal is reconstructed from the perturbed log
power magnitude spectrum and the phase spectrum of its cor-
responding original audio signal. We presented to listeners
50 randomly chosen adversarial-original audio pairs (i.e., A
and B), from each of which we randomly choose one as the
reference audio (i.e., X). Five listeners take part in the XAB
listening test, where they are asked to choose from A and B
one audio which sounds more like the reference audio X.
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.1. Countermeasure performance
Anti-spoofing performance of the three countermeasure mod-
els, LCNN-Big, LCNN-Small and SENet12, is evaluated via
the minimum normalized tandem detection cost function (t-
DCF) and the equal error rate (EER), as shown in Table 4.
Note that the LCNN-Big model achieves comparable perfor-
mance with that reported in [34], and the SENet12 model
has even better performance than the best performing single
model reported in [33].
5.2. Adversarial attack results
The subjective XAB listening test in subsection 4.3 results
in average classification accuracy of 48.4%, which confirms
(a) Reference. (b) Adv. example. (c) Adv. perturbation.
Fig. 3. Sub-figures (a)-(c) are spectrograms of original audio,
adversarial audio and adversarial perturbation of the utterance
LA E 1001227. The attack is conducted to the LCNN-big
model using the PGD method, where  = 5, number of itera-
tions is 10 and number of random restarts is 5.
Table 4. Anti-spoofing performance of the three counter-
measure models, LCNN-big, LCNN-small and SENet12.
Model Dev Eval
t-DCFminnorm EER(%) t-DCF
min
norm EER(%)
LCNN-big 0.0010 0.047 0.1052 3.875
LCNN-small 0 0.002 0.1577 6.226
SENet12 0 0 0.1737 6.077
Table 5. White-box attack performance of the FGSM and
the PGD method.
EER(%)  = 0.1  = 1  = 5FGSM PGD FGSM PGD FGSM PGD
LCNN-big 4.691 6.256 36.504 54.382 48.457 93.119
LCNN-small 7.613 17.419 34.670 73.649 48.375 89.845
SENet12 7.737 13.896 24.936 62.681 51.626 87.220
the validity of the adversarial audio attacks. Spectrograms of
original audio, adversarial audio and adversarial perturbation
of the utterance LA E 1001227 is shown in Fig. 3, where the
attack is conducted to the LCNN-big model using the PGD
method, with  = 5, number of iterations = 10 and number of
random restarts = 5. We can see that the adversarial perturbed
spectrogram is almost visually indistinguishable from that of
the original audio signal. If we set the EER point of the evalu-
ation set as the operating point, the utterance LA E 1001227
is wrongly classified as ”bona fide” in this setting. In the fol-
lowing subsections, we use the EER as metric to evaluate the
performance of adversarial attacks by the means of the FGSM
or the PGD method, under both white-box and black-box sce-
narios.
(a) LCNN-big and LCNN-small. (b) LCNN-big and SENet12. (c) LCNN-small and SENet12.
Fig. 4. Black-box attack performance of the FGSM and the PGD method.
5.2.1. White-box attacks
The white-box attack performance of the FGSM and the PGD
method using different ′s is shown in Table 5. The EERs of
all three countermeasure models increase as  grows. PGD
attacks attain larger EERs than FGSM attacks in all three
countermeasure models and all the settings of  under the
white-box attack scenario. The EERs of all three models un-
der the FGSM attacks reach near 50% when  = 5. As for
PGD, the EERs are greater than 50% when  = 1, and are
greater than 85% when  = 5, which will result in reversed
classification decision if the operating point is pre-defined by
the EER point on the evaluation set. We can conclude from
the white-box attack results that the reliability of all three
countermeasure models are challenged and broken down by
FGSM or PGD attacks under the scenario of white-box attack.
The PGD method is more effective than the FGSM. Research
on more advanced countermeasure models should be done to
keep pace with today’s white-box adversarial attacks.
5.2.2. Black-box attacks
In this part, we study adversarial attacks of the FGSM and the
PGD method from the perspective of black-box scenario. As
shown in Fig 4, the black-box attacks achieve a resounding
success in all the mutual attack settings: LCNN-big with
LCNN-small, LCNN-big with SENet12 and LCNN-small
with SENet12. In a large fraction of attacking scenarios, the
attack method of PGD attains larger EER than the FGSM
method, leading to that the PGD method tends to generate
more powerful adversarial examples. According to Fig. 4(a)
and 4(b), adversarial examples generated by LCNN-big with
rather more parameters are more powerful as they can at-
tack smaller models, LCNN-small and SENet12, with larger
EERs, while adversarial examples generated by LCNN-small
and SENet12 fail to attack LCNN-big with such large EERs.
So in our experimental setup, we can safely conclude adver-
sarial examples from small models are outperformed by large
models in terms of the performance of attack for both the
FGSM and PGD methods. According to the red dotted line
with triangle marker and red dash-dot line with circle marker
in Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b), the adversarial examples generated
by LCNN-big attain greater EER when attack LCNN-small
rather than RESNet12, resulting in a conclusion that adver-
sarial attacks are much easier realized under similar model
structure. According to Fig 4(c), the attack efficacy of adver-
sarial examples generated by LCNN-small outperforms the
adversarial examples from SENet12.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the vulnerability of spoof-
ing countermeasures for ASV under both white-box and
black-box adversarial attacks using the FGSM and PGD
method. We have also compared performance of black-box
attacks across spoofing countermeasure models with different
network architectures and different amount of parameters.
We implement three countermeasure models, i.e., LCNN-big,
LCNN-small and SENet12, and conduct adversarial attacks
on them. The experimental results show that all three models
are subject to FGSM and PGD attacks under the scenario of
white-box attack. The more dangerous black-box attacks are
also proved to be effective by the experimental results. For
the future work, we would like to adopt adversarial training
methods to improve the robustness of countermeasure models
and make them less vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
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